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Noting that very few disputes have been adjudicated, many scholars have expressed doubts whether the
dispute settlement mechanisms of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) will ever be used. This
article argues that looking only at the number of formal disputes (i.e. disputes that lead to the
adoption of a decision by third party adjudicators) tells an incomplete story about dispute resolution
in PTAs (i.e. resolution of disputed issues). Focusing on the PTAs concluded by the European
Union (EU), this article contends that the framework established by the PTAs can have a
complementary role to litigation. Like the committees at the World Trade Organization, the
committees established by the PTAs can foster dialogue and find technical solutions to disputed
issues. By looking at the text of the EU PTAs as well as at available documents on their
implementation, this article shows how these committees can tackle disputes.
1 INTRODUCTION: THE FORTUNES AND MISFORTUNES OF THE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS OF PREFERENTIAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS
The dispute settlement mechanisms of preferential trade agreements1 (PTA DSMs) are
lying dormant. Yet, PTA DSMs have the potential to be a success story. PTAs are
increasingly relevant for international trade, with almost than 300 currently in force.2
Moreover, the scope for litigation under a PTA is broader than under the World Trade
Organization (WTO), as PTAs’ competence encompasses not only (1) obligations that
are substantially equivalent toWTO obligations, but also (2) obligations that are outside
the mandate of the WTO, such as environment or labour commitments (WTO-X
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1 This paper uses the term ‘preferential trade agreement’ (PTA) to indicate any agreements concluded
between two or more countries to strengthen and enhance their trade relations beyond the framework
of the World Trade Organization. Depending on their characteristics and on the context, these
agreements are also referred to as ‘free trade agreements’, ‘regional trade agreements’, or ‘trade blocs’.
2 WTO, Regional Trade Agreement Database, http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx
(accessed 21 June 2018).
obligations), and (3) obligations that are within the mandate of the WTO, but which
deepen the multilateral commitment (WTO+ obligations).3
With an increasing number of PTAs, and an increasing scope for litigation,
one could expect a high number of disputes. In spite of their potential, however,
PTA DSMs continue to slumber. Only 33 concluded disputes are known (i.e.
disputes for which a final decision has been issued).4 Apart from the exceptional
experience of Latin American agreements,5 some PTAs only report a few cases,
while most PTAs do not report litigation at all.
Several authors have tried to explain the reasons of the lack of use of PTA
DSMs. Davey has mainly attributed it to the problems of legitimacy of PTA
DSMs.6 In his opinion, the WTO is always perceived as more legitimate because,
in many ways, and ‘in spite of apparent similarities’, it is ‘more adjudicative in
nature and therefore less power-based’ than PTA DSMs.7 Similarly, Porges has
explained that the WTO, along with its institutions and its history, offers a much
more stable and predictable – and hence attractive – forum than any PTA DSM.8
Using a vast set of interviews, Trommer has shown the preference that trade
practitioners have for the infrastructure and institutional support offered by the
WTO.9 Explanations on the political implications of litigating before a PTA DSM
as opposed to before the WTO have been offered by other authors. Pierola and
Horlick have focused their analysis on the soft power that the WTO system can
ensure in the resolution of a dispute, especially through the role of third-parties.10
3 Horn, Mavroidis, & Sapir, Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements,
33 The World Economy 1565 (2010).
4 To the knowledge of the present author, the most comprehensive list of disputes under PTAs is
available on the website of the Law Offices of Amelia Porges, http://www.porgeslaw.com/rta-
disputes/ (accessed 20 June 2018). The list I present excludes, however, cases from the DSMs that
have evolved in very sophisticated courts where disputes go beyond the state-to-state model, and
whose jurisdiction can hence be triggered by individual applicants, domestic courts, or surveillance
bodies. These are: the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the Court of the European
Free Trade Agreement (EFTA Court), and the Court of Justice of the Andean Community. It has
been reported that African PTAs have active courts (James Thuo Gathii, African Regional Trade
Agreements as Legal Regimes, Cambridge University Press 2013), but these have not been included as
it is not clear how many cases are state-to-state trade disputes.
5 Laura Gomez-Mera & Andrea Molinari, Overlapping Institutions, Learning, and Dispute Initiation in
Regional Trade Agreements: Evidence from South America, 58 Int’l Stud. Q. 269 (2014).
6 William Davey, ‘Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs: A Comment’ [2006] Regional Trade
Agreements and the WTO Legal System 343.
7 Ibid.
8 Amelia Porges, ‘Dispute Settlement’, Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development: a Handbook
(The World Bank 2011).
9 Silke Trommer, The WTO in an Era of Preferential Trade Agreements: Thick and Thin Institutions in Global
Trade Governance, World Trade Rev. 1 (2017).
10 Fernando Piérola & Gary Horlick, WTO Dispute Settlement and Dispute Settlement in the North-South
Agreements of the Americas: Considerations for Choice of Forum, 41 J. World Trade 883 (2007).
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As PTAs cannot guarantee the same peer pressure, States would always opt to
litigate at the WTO.
Nevertheless, these contributions tell only part of the story. While they offer
comprehensive explanations on why the WTO may be a better-placed forum than
PTA DSMs for litigating violations of substantially equivalent obligations, they do
not explain the lack of litigation on violations of PTA obligations that could not be
brought to the WTO: WTO+ and WTO-X obligations. Why aren’t these obliga-
tions litigated in the DSMs of PTA? Recent research has highlighted that the text of
PTAs often excludes these areas from the competence of PTA DSMs.11 Moreover,
not all PTA obligations contain clear and strong undertakings that could be success-
fully invoked in a dispute. According to the classification made by Horn et al, the
PTAs concluded by the United States (US), and even more by the European Union
(EU), contain a significant number of vague, or non-enforceable, obligations.12
Moreover, even if the WTO was a better forum for dispute resolution, PTA partners
do not use it: as Mavroidis and Sapír have shown, the signature of a PTA tends to be
correlated with a lower number of disputes among PTA partners before theWTO as
well.13
Yet, PTA partners have implementation issues, and voice them. In the recent
report on implementation of EU PTAs, for example, the EU Commission has
highlighted the outstanding issues in the relations with trade partners.14 Against this
background, one can wonder: if the PTA DSMs fail to perform their dispute
resolution function, how do PTA partners resolve their disputes? Looking only at
the number of formal disputes (i.e. disputes that lead to the adoption of a decision
by third party adjudicators) tells an incomplete story about dispute resolution in
PTAs (i.e. resolution of disputed issues). As it has been effectively described for the
WTO, formal disputes are ‘not just the tip, but the tip of the tip of the iceberg’.15
Part of the dispute resolution may happen already during the negotiations phase: as
it has been described, PTA partners try to resolve their outstanding issues while
negotiating the PTA.16
11 Marc D Froese, Mapping the Scope of Dispute Settlement in Regional Trade Agreements: Implications for the
Multilateral Governance of Trade 15 World Trade Rev. 563 (2016).
12 Horn, Mavroidis & Sapir, supra n. 3.
13 Petros C. Mavroidis & André Sapir, Dial PTAs for Peace: The Influence of Preferential Trade Agreements on
Litigation between Trading Partners, 49 J. World Trade 351 (2015).
14 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee af the Regions on Implementation of Free Trade Agreements,
9 Nov. 2017 COM(2017) 654 final, at 35–36 (‘EU Commission, Report on Implementation of Free
Trade Agreements 2017’).
15 Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘A Survey of the Literature on the WTO Dispute Settlement
System’ [2006] IFN Working Paper, No. 684.
16 Jorge Alberto Huerta-Goldman, Mexico in the WTO and NAFTA: Litigating International Trade
Disputes (Kluwer Law International 2010), as quoted in: Petros C. Mavroidis & André Sapir, Dial
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By the same token, some scholars have also noted the complementary role that
the committees established by the PTAs can play in the settlement of disputes.17
However, no research has been done on their design and functioning. In this article,
I examine the dispute settlement role of these committees, focusing on the PTAs
concluded by the EUwith its trade partners. The EU is a good case study, insofar as it
has concluded more than 30 PTAs (some of which are already quite old), but it has
never used their DSMs.18
In the next Section, I analyse the design and the functioning of the commit-
tees established in EU PTAs, with a view to understanding their possible com-
plementary role in dispute resolution. In the third Section, I outline the outcome
and limitations of this analysis. In the fourth Section, I describe a paradigmatic
example of how the EU and Colombia tried to resolve a dispute first by negotiat-
ing, then in the committees, and finally at the WTO. Although eventually this
dispute was not resolved in the framework of the PTAs, it is an important example
of how trade partners can resolve a dispute in this framework. Finally, in the last
section I draw some conclusions.
2 INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE COMMITTEES OF
EU PTAS
Committees in trade agreements are not only a characteristic of PTAs. In
addition to the General Council, about forty committees and working groups
have been established at the WTO with the task of overseeing the functioning
of the WTO agreements.19 Research on the committee on sanitary and
phytosanitary measures (SPS) and on the committee on technical barriers to
trade (TBT) has highlighted that these committees can perform a role in
conflict resolution.20 In these committees, WTO members can raise ‘specific
trade concerns’ on the difficulties that their producers and exporters
PTAs for Peace: The Influence of Preferential Trade Agreements on Litigation between Trading Partners, 49
J. World Trade 351 (2015).
17 Davey, supra n. 6; Ignacio Garcia Bercero, Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements:
Lessons Learned?, in Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Lorand Bartels & Federico
Ortino eds, Oxford University Press 2006); Amelia Porges, supra n. 8.
18 EU Commission, Report on Implementation of Free Trade Agreements 2017, at 36, supra n. 14.
19 Bernard Hoekman, The WTO: Functions and Basic Principles, in Development, Trade, and the WTO: A
Handbook (World Bank 2002, at 41).
20 Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary (Oxford
University Press 2009); Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis & Erik N. Wijkstrom, In the Shadow of the
DSU: Addressing Specific Trade Concerns in the WTO SPS and TBT Committees, 47 J. World Trade 729
(2013); Marianna B. Karttunen, Transparency and Dispute Settlement: A Study of the Agreements on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade (Unpublished Thesis) (European
University Institute 2016).
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encounter in accessing foreign markets. Sometimes these concerns are
resolved without need to trigger formal litigation proceedings. Several factors
can explain why these committees manage to resolve some of the concerns.
The fact that these concerns are raised in a multilateral forum and ‘name-
shame’ the infringers is the first reason that explains the mechanisms that
make these committee perform a dispute resolution function. But it is not the
only one. Their ‘expert-driven approach’ has been cited as another reason for
their functioning.21 Moreover, it has been suggested that the fact that they
allow for ‘argument and persuasion’ may also explain how many issues are
resolved.22
Like the WTO, PTAs typically establish one or more committees. The
following two sub-Sections describe, respectively, how the committees of EU
PTAs are designed, and how trade concerns are addressed within them. To this
end, I analyse two sets of documents: the text of EU PTAs, and the available
documents on their implementation.
The EU has concluded different types of PTAs that bear different names: (1)
agreements with future EU countries or close neighbours, (2) agreements with
near-bordering countries, (3) agreements with developing countries, and the (4)
agreements with distant countries.23 Another way of classifying EU PTAs is to
divide them between a ‘first’ and a ‘second’ generation, whose watershed point is
represented by the launch of the Global Europe strategy in 2006.24 The list of
PTAs analysed in this article, along with a list of abbreviations, is provided in
Annex 1.
It should be stressed that the four categories of EU PTAs outlined above
are very different from each other, as they comprise EU PTAs with very
different characteristics, goals and scope. In particular, the EU PTAs in
category (1) and (2) are the agreements with strategic partners with a strong
political component. EU PTAs of category (3), those with developing coun-
tries, are PTAs characterized by a development component, and hence,
asymmetry of power. Overall, the EU PTAs in category (1), (2), and (3) are
politically sensitive and/or characterized by asymmetry of power. Therefore,
it can be expected that dispute resolution to be more relevant with respect to
EU PTAs in category (4). Yet, it is possible that informal dispute resolution
takes place within the EU PTAs in category (1), (2), and (3) as well. The
21 Horn, Mavroidis & Wijkstrom, supra n. 20.
22 Scott, supra n. 20, at 75.
23 Raymond J. Ahearn, Europe’s Preferential Trade Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications (CRS
Report for Congress 2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41143.pdf (accessed 3 Feb. 2016).
24 European Commission, Global Europe: A Stronger Partnership To Deliver Market Access For European
Exporters COM(2007) 183 final (2007).
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nature of these agreements may make their parties less likely to start formal
dispute settlement proceedings, but still willing to discuss their implementa-
tion issues. In this context, informal dispute resolution may be the only
avenue to address their concerns. Another difference among these agreements
is that the Court of Justice of the European Union has recognized, on a case-
by-case basis, direct effect to some of their provisions; but this trend has
become less important in the past ten years.25
In addition to the text of the agreements, I have reviewed all the
available documents on implementation of EU PTAs. Some documents on
the implementation of EU PTAs have been published on the EU
Commission’s website. For EU-Korea, EU-Colombia/Peru, and EU-Central
America, the EU Commission has the obligation to publish an annual report
on implementation, which includes a section on the activities of the
committees.26 Moreover, in November 2017, for the first time, the EU
Commission published a comprehensive report on implementation of PTAs,
which also includes a brief summary of the work of the committees.27
Moreover, following a request under Regulation 1049/2011,28 I have
obtained partial access to the minutes of the main committee established
under the EU-Colombia/Peru PTA. Additional documents have been used,
and are referred to in the footnotes.
2.1 THE DESIGN OF EU PTA committees
All EU PTAs have what I call a ‘governing committee’, which is the committee
typically held at ministerial level, or at the level of senior civil servants. The
governing committee can have different tasks, but its main one is to oversee
and monitor the implementation of the agreement. Depending on whether
additional committees are established, the structure of committees in EU PTAs
can be divided into three main groups. A table representing these three groups
is provided below, while a detailed list of all the known committees established
under EU PTAs is provided in Annex 2.
25 Christopher Vajda, The EU and Beyond: Dispute Resolution in International Economic Agreements 29 Eur. J.
Int’l L. 205 (2018).
26 Regulation (EU) No. 511/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011, Art.
13(1); Regulation (EU) No. 19/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 Jan. 2013;
Regulation (EU) No. 20/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 Jan. 2013.
27 EU Commission, Report on Implementation of Free Trade Agreements 2017, supra n. 14.
28 Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, L145/43.
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Table 1 EU PTAs divided according to the number of committees established
Committees Established EU PTAs
Only governing committee EU-Syria; EU-Andorra; EU-Faroe Islands;
EU-FYROM; EU-San Marino; EU-ESA;
EU-Cameroon; EU-Ghana; EU-Côte d’Ivoire;
EU-Pacific
Governing committee and managing
committee
EU-Turkey; EU-Albania; EU-CARIFORUM;
EU-Montenegro; EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina;
EU-SADC; EU-Kosovo









This first group of EU PTAs comprises agreements do not show any institu-
tional structure beyond the governing committee. This group includes some
old (pre-2006)29 or interim30 PTAs, as well as a PTA with two small devel-
oping partners.31
The second group comprises the EUPTAs that establish an institutional framework
where the governing committee is supported in its work by a managing committee,
which typically meets at the level of senior civil servants. This group comprises different
types of PTAs: agreements with neighbouring, near-neighbouring, and developing
countries (the categories (1), (2), and (3) described above).32 Some of these are old
(pre-2006), but some are more recent. The lack of an institutional framework with
several committees for these agreements may be explained by several factors. Some of
these agreements are old, with a limited scope, or temporary. Moreover, the choice of a
simpler institutional structure may also depend on the parties’ willingness to keep the
dialogue at the level of ministers of senior civil servants.
29 EU-Syria; EU-Andorra; EU-Faroe Islands; EU-FYROM; EU-San Marino.
30 EU-ESA; EU-Cameroon; EU-Ghana; EU-Côte d’Ivoire.
31 EU-Pacific.
32 EU-Turkey; EU-Albania; EU-CARIFORUM; EU-Montenegro; EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina; EU-
SADC; EU-Kosovo.
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Finally, the last group comprises the EU PTAs that, in addition to the
governing and the managing committee, establish a set of sub-committees and/
or working groups specialized in areas such as SPS, TBT, customs, geographical
indications, intellectual property or financial services. While the text of the PTAs
typically clarifies that the governing committee and the managing committee
should meet at, respectively, ministerial and senior civil servants’ level, the com-
position of sub-committees is never specified. Nevertheless, a contextual reading of
the provisions and of the documents available suggests that these committees are
mostly made up of technical experts. This group includes two sub-groups.
The first sub-group includes the EU PTAs whose text does not foresee
specific sub-committees, but that, according to the information available,33 have
over time established a set of sub-committees.34 No information is available on
when and how the establishment of these sub-committees was decided. It is
possible that these sub-committees have been in place since the PTAs started
being applied. It is equally possible that the sub-committees were developed
over time, when the parties realized that they had many outstanding technical
implementation issues to discuss. This sub-group comprises mostly pre-2006 PTAs
with bordering or near-bordering countries (category (1) and (2) described above).
The second sub-group includes the EU PTAs whose text foresees the establish-
ment of sub-committees. It should be remarked that the framework established by
these agreements generally provides for more and more specialized sub-committees
than the ones of the first sub-group. This sub-group is the most homogeneous: it
comprises all the PTAs with distant countries (category (4) described above) as well as
the PTAs with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova (deep and comprehensive post-2006
PTAs that fall within the category (2) described above).35 It is interesting to note that
the first EU PTA that foresees this developed institutional structure is EU-Mexico,
followed by EU-Chile. The fact that these agreements are included in this sub-group
excludes the possibility that sub-committees are typical of the modern post-2006 EU
policy. A developed structure of sub-committees seems instead characteristic of the
deepest and most comprehensive trade agreements signed by the EU with distant or
near-bordering countries.
33 Commission Staff Working Document, Country reports and info sheets on implementation of EU
Free Trade Agreements, accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on
Implementation of Free Trade Agreements (9 Nov. 2017), SWD(2017) 364 final (‘Commission Staff
Working Document, Country reports and info sheets on implementation of EU Free Trade
Agreements 2017’).
34 EU-Switzerland; EEA; EU-Palestinian Authority; EU-Israel; EU-Tunisia; EU-Morocco; EU-Jordan;
EU-Egypt; EU-Lebanon; EU-Algeria; EU-Serbia.
35 EU-Mexico; EU-Chile; EU-Korea; EU-Central America; EU-Colombia/Peru; EU-Moldova;
EU-Georgia; EU-Ukraine; EU-Canada.
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An overview of Table 1 shows that the committees of EU PTAs within the
same category tend to be quite similar. This is not surprising. A textual analysis of a
broader set of PTAs has shown that ‘copy-and-paste’ is often used in trade
negotiations: on average, a PTA reproduces 2/3 of the language of the closest
PTA.36
2.2 THE DIALOGUE WITHIN EU PTA COMMITTEES
Can all these PTA committees play a role in resolving disputes? Some EU PTA
committees are given an explicit dispute resolution function.37 For the other
committees, a dispute resolution role, while not explicit, seems nonetheless
implied in their tasks: overseeing and monitoring the implementation and
application of the agreement, as well as taking the appropriate decisions and
measures.
The documents available show that EU PTA committee meetings take
place annually, and they discuss implementation issues extensively.38 This is
true for all the PTAs from the three groups described in the Section above,
including old PTAs that only have a governing committee and a managing
committee such as EU-Turkey. For the EU PTAs with a developed institu-
tional framework (the third group described above), the bulk of the work is
placed on the technical sub-committees. The governing or managing com-
mittee, conversely, takes stock of the work of the sub-committees, and re-
discusses the most critical issues at a higher political level.
Based on the minutes that I obtained through access to documents, the table
below lists all the issues discussed during the meetings of the governing committee
of the EU-Colombia/Peru PTA, and traces their evolution over three years. I
reported all the issues that were discussed specifically, and that were introduced as
‘points’, ‘issues’, or ‘concerns’. I did not include issues in relation to which the
parties only sought clarification or more information. The last column reports the
opinion of the EU Commission in their document on implementation of PTAs
published in 2017.39
36 Todd Allee & Manfred Elsig, Are the Contents of International Treaties Copied-and-Pasted? Evidence
from Preferential Trade Agreements, [2016] NCCR Trade Working Papers, http://boris.unibe.ch/
89220/3/Are%20the%20Contents%20of%20International%20Treaties.pdf (accessed 1 May 2017).
37 E.g. EU-Colombia/Peru, Art. 13(1)(g); EU-Korea, Art. 15.1(3)(e); EU-Canada, Art. 26.1(4)(c).
38 Commission Staff Working Document, Country reports and info sheets on implementation of EU
Free Trade Agreements 2017, supra n. 33.
39 EU Commission, Report on Implementation of Free Trade Agreements 2017, at 12, supra n. 14.
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Table 2 List of Issues Discussed During the Meetings of the Governing Committee (Trade
Committee) of the EU–Colombia/Peru PTA in the Years 2014–2016. A Sign ‘–’ Means
that the Issue was not Discussed in the Document Concerned. In the Last Column, Some
Cells are Left Blank as the Report was not Supposed to Cover them at all: the EU
Commission Report on Implementation of FTAs only Reports Implementation Issues from
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The table above shows that several specific concerns were raised and discussed by
the parties. The dispute resolution dynamic between the sub-committees and the
governing committee could be tentatively described as follows. When the issue is
purely technical, it is solved in the context of the sub-committees. This is for
example the case of the acceptance by Colombia and Peru of the implementation
of the so-called ‘regionalisation principle’ in SPS matters. This issue is reported as
resolved in the third meeting of the SPS sub-committee,40 and in the EU
Commission report on implementation of EU PTAs.41 Yet, it was never men-
tioned in the minutes of the governing committee.
When the issue is more controversial, and cannot be resolved at the technical
level, the parties can decide to re-discuss it in the governing committee. In doing
40 EU Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Third
Annual Report on the Implementation of the EU-Colombia/Peru Trade Agreement (10 Oct. 2017),
COM(2017) 585 final, at 8.
41 EU Commission, Report on Implementation of Free Trade Agreements 2017, at 12, supra n. 14.
INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN PREFERENTIAL TRADE 105
so, the parties probably seek to increase political pressure. As shown by Table 2,
some of the issues that were raised in the first or second meeting of the governing
committee have disappeared by the third. One issue (pre-listing) was reported as
resolved during the second meeting. No news is available with respect to the other
issues: they might have been resolved, or they might have simply lost relevance,
and have been put aside. Conversely, some of the issues raised in the first or third
meeting of the governing committee keep being discussed up to the third meeting.
The fact that an issue keeps re-appearing in the discussion of the governing
committee is a sign that the dispute has not been resolved. Most of these recurring
issues, indeed, correspond to the issues that the EU Commission has highlighted as
persisting concerns in its report on implementation of EU PTAs, as shown in the
fourth column of Table 2.
These documents show that PTA Committees meet, discuss, and resolve some
issues. Sometimes they handle difficult issues. This was the case, for example, of the
market of truck scrappage in Colombia. The minutes of the governing committee
show that the EU raised concerns with respect to the lack of access to this
market.42 However, this issue was considered a particularly sensitive issue in
Colombia. Despite its political willingness to resolve it, Colombia reportedly
found it difficult to regulate a sector that was the livelihood of thousands of
families.43 Nevertheless, one year later, Colombia adopted a reform that eliminated
market restrictions in the sector, and thus the issue was considered resolved.44
Another difficult issue was the Colombia taxation system on spirits. As described in
section 4, however, this could not be resolved within the framework of the PTA.
3 INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ASSESSMENT AND
LIMITATIONS
The available documents reveal interesting facts about the functioning of EU PTAs
and the dialogue that takes place within the committees. Considered together, they
show the potential dynamics of informal dispute resolution within the PTAs.
Although they provide some interesting information, it should be stressed that
the documents available for this research are limited in scope, and thus they should
only be considered a point of departure.
42 Acta de la segunda reunión del comité de comercio, acuerdo comercio entre Colombia y Peru, y la
Unión Europea; Bogotá, viernes 19 de junio 2015, at 3/6 (‘Acta de la segunda reunión del comité de
comercio EU-Colombia/Peru, 2015’). On file with the author.
43 Ibid.
44 Minutes of the third meeting of the trade committee of the EU-Colombia/Peru Trade Agreement, 9
Dec. 2016, Brussels, at 3/7 (‘Minutes of the third meeting of the trade committee of the EU-
Colombia/Peru Trade Agreement 2016’). On file with the author.
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First of all, the documents are focused only on the EU, and many of them
(with the exception of the minutes of the EU-Colombia/Peru governing com-
mittee) represent mainly the point of view of the EU. Moreover, the documents
on implementation of EU PTAs published by the EU Commission are only partial,
and little information is available on the establishment of additional sub-commit-
tees and their work. A review of the dialogue within the EU PTA committees
would benefit from including the minutes of committees other than that of the
EU-Colombia/Peru PTA. Unfortunately, the minutes are not public and difficult
to obtain. In addition to the minutes of the EU-Colombia/Peru agreement, I
requested access to some more documents in the EU under Regulation 1049/
2011.45 However, due to the necessity to seek the other State’s consent, the
process of requesting access to the PTA documents is long, unpredictable, and
likely to be rejected.46
The lack of transparency seems, regrettably, a characteristic of PTAs. PTAs
escape the fairly transparent system provided by the WTO.47 We cannot
possibly know everything that the WTO delegates discuss, but a substantial
amount of publications and data can be found on the WTO website. As
discussed in section 2, for example, access to the documents of the WTO
committees has allowed research on their role in settling disputes. The infor-
mation available on PTAs pales in comparison to this. Yet, transparency
increases scrutiny, accountability, and understanding. Attention to transparency
is growing in international law in general,48 as well as in dispute settlement and
international economic law.49 In spite of the recent emphasis on transparency
in the negotiations of EU PTAs,50 little has been said on transparency in the
implementation phase. This phase is not less important, since, as shown in this
45 Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, L145/43.
46 I have requested access to the minutes of the main committee of four EU PTAs: EU-Mexico, EU-
Chile, EU-Colombia/Peru, and EU-Korea. The outcome has been quite varied: one request was
partially accepted (EU-Colombia/Peru); one request was rejected (EU-Korea); one request was
rejected but supplemented with other documents (EU-Mexico: I have received the press releases),
and for the last request (EU-Chile) I was informed that the minutes are non-existent.
47 Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert Wolfe, From Sunshine to a Common Agent: The Evolving Understanding of
Transparency in the WTO The World Trade Organization at Twenty 21 Brown J. World Aff. 117 (2014).
48 Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters, Transparency in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2013).
49 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sergio Puig & David G. Victor, Against Secrecy: The Social Cost of
International Dispute Settlement, 42 Yale J. Int’l L. 279 (2017).
50 As a result of the calls for transparency, the EU Commission published a factsheet on transparency in
trade negotiations, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/june/tradoc_151381.pdf (accessed 14
Feb. 2018). Moreover, the EU Commission has recently published the proposals and draft texts of the
negotiated PTAs.
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article, the parties discuss the interpretation of the agreements, and negotiate
further arrangements and technical regulations.
Against this background, it seems very difficult to conclude to what extent
the PTA committees can be considered an effective way of resolving disputes.
First, it should be stressed that by definition it is impossible to affirm that a simple
dispute (i.e. a disagreement among the parties), if not resolved, would become a
formal dispute (i.e. trigger litigation procedures). Previous research has shown
that the choice to bring a particular trade dispute to formal dispute settlement
depends on multiple political and institutional factors.51 Accordingly, this article
does not attempt to affirm that the framework established by the PTAs resolves
disputes that would otherwise trigger the DSMs or would be litigated at the
WTO. Rather, it points at the fact that formal dispute resolution is only one part
of the broader dispute resolution that takes place in the framework established by
the PTAs.
A second difficult and related question on effectiveness is whether these
committees solve issues that would be solved in any bilateral meeting, or whether
their design and special role in the PTAs architecture makes them an effective
forum to solve disputes. PTA committee meetings constantly monitor the imple-
mentation of the PTAs. This can foster dialogue, understanding, and mutual trust.
In this respect, the establishment of a formal setting, along with rules of procedure
and periodic meetings, could make the resolution of disputes within PTA com-
mittees more likely than in an ordinary bilateral meeting. PTA committees have
one obvious difference from the WTO committees: they are not embedded in an
institutionalized multilateral organization. Yet, at the same time, as shown above,
advanced and comprehensive PTAs tend to reproduce the structure of the many
specialized WTO committees and their main features: expert-driven approach and
close dialogue.
The methodological challenges highlighted above make it difficult to test
these hypotheses. Accordingly, this article can only lay a stepping stone in this
direction, by showing how EU PTA committees are designed, and how dialogue
takes place within them.
51 Henrik Horn et al., Is the Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased? vol. 2340 (Centre for
Economic Policy Research 1999), http://www.econ-law.se/Papers/Disputes000117.PDF (accessed
19 Nov. 2015); Eric Reinhardt, Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of GATT/WTO Dispute
Initiation, 1948–1998 (Citeseer 2000), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.
513.8591&rep=rep1&type=pdf (accessed 19 Nov. 2015); Chad P. Bown, Participation in WTO
Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders, 19 World Bank Econ. Rev. 287
(2005); Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of
Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes, 34 J. Legal Stud. 557 (2005); Christina L. Davis, Why
Adjudicate?: Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO (Princeton University Press 2012).
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4 A PARADIGMATIC EXAMPLE: THE DISPUTE ON TAXATION OF
SPIRITS BETWEEN THE EU AND COLOMBIA
The case of taxation of spirits in Colombia mentioned above seems a good
example to illustrate how disputes can be tackled within the framework of
PTAs. Although the dispute was not resolved, this case demonstrates is how the
trade partners sought to resolve a dispute in the framework of a PTA.
Before starting the negotiations of the EU-Colombia/Peru PTA, Colombia
had a system of taxation that allegedly discriminated against imported spirits. Its
national and local taxes on spirits were divided into two brackets, the division
point of which was fixed at 35% of alcoholic content. As a result of this ‘artificial’
split, the EU argued, most imported spirits fell into the higher bracket, whilst
national spirits fell into the lower.52 When the negotiations of the PTA were
concluded in 2011, Colombia undertook a specific commitment to end this
taxation system by August 2015.53 By doing so, Colombia and the EU demon-
strated that, as argued by Mavroidis and Sapír, some disputes are addressed during
the negotiations of PTAs.54
This negotiated solution, however, did not work: Colombia failed to respect
it. As a consequence, the issue started being discussed in the sub-committees and in
the governing committee of the EU-Colombia/Peru PTA between 2014 and
2015, with the EU urging Colombia to respect its commitment.55 Colombia
explained that two obstacles prevented it from abiding by the commitment: the
equilibrium of the tax system, and the risk of smuggling.56 At the same time,
Colombia reaffirmed its willingness to overcome these obstacles, and stated that to
this end it had asked for technical assistance to European States.57 The EU
recognized the political willingness of Colombia. However, it also stated that the
bill presented did not yet comply with Colombia’s obligations.58 In this respect,
the EU and Colombia proved willing to engage in a dialogue within the PTA
committees. Nevertheless, they were unable to resolve the conflict in this forum.
52 EU Commission, press release, EU requests WTO consultations over Colombia’s discrimination
against imported spirits (13 Jan. 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1432&
title=EU-requests-WTO-consultations-over-Colombias-discrimination-against-imported-spirits
(accessed 16 Feb. 2018).
53 Ibid.
54 Mavroidis & Sapir, supra n. 13.
55 Acta, Acuerdo Comercial entre el Perú y Colombia por una Parte, y la Unión Europea y sus Estados
Miembros por Otra; Primera Reunión del Comité de Comercio, at 2/7 (‘Acta de la primera reunión
del comité de comercio EU-Colombia/Peru, 2014’). On file with the author.
56 Acta de la segunda reunión del comité de comercio EU-Colombia/Peru (2015), at 2/6, supra n. 42.
57 Ibid., at 3/6.
58 Ibid.
INFORMAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN PREFERENTIAL TRADE 109
A few months before the expiry of the August 2015 deadline, the EU declared
that it was considering legal action.59 It did not clarify which forum it was
considering, but, in January 2016, it requested consultations at the WTO.60 It
alleged, inter alia, a violation of Article III:1, III:2, and III:4 of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In August 2016, when the consultations
failed, the EU promptly requested the establishment of a panel.61 The panel was
never composed, but the issue was promptly resolved anyway. The minutes of the
meeting of the governing committee of the EU-Colombia/Peru PTA show that in
December 2016 Colombia was in the process of adopting a new law that was
approved by the EU.62 The EU Commission’s report on the implementation of
EU PTAs of November 2017 confirmed that the dispute was resolved.63 In this
case, recourse to the WTO resolved a dispute that the parties could not resolve in
the framework of the PTA.
A discussion on the reasons why the EU chose to have recourse to the WTO
rather than the PTA DSM goes beyond the scope of this article. Three minor
remarks on these proceedings can be nonetheless made. First, the DSM of the EU-
Colombia/Peru PTA did not prove inefficient, it was simply neglected. The DSM
had a pre-approved list of arbitrators from which the EU could have drawn the
names of the arbitrators if Colombia refused to appoint them.64 Second, the EU
had a choice between the two fora, because, in addition to not having respected
one of the commitments embedded in the PTA, the challenged measure could be
easily understood as a violation of GATT obligations. However, as noted in the
introduction, not all the violations of PTA obligations can be brought to the
WTO. Third, Colombia showed the political willingness to act, which was
recognised by the EU, as it waited until the expiry date before starting the
WTO proceedings. A difficult outstanding question remains: why did they resort
to litigation, if in the end they resolved the dispute before it was adjudicated? This
question does not have easy answers. The soft power that the WTO exercises
through its multilateral membership might have helped.65 Moreover, recourse to
WTO litigation might have simply been a strategy to signal to the domestic
industries the importance that both the EU and Colombia attached to the issue.66
59 Ibid., at 2/6.
60 Colombia – Measures Concerning Imported Spirits, Request for consultations by the European
Union, WT/DS502/1 (18 Jan. 2016).
61 Colombia – Measures Concerning Imported Spirits, Request for the establishment of a panel by the
European Union, WT/DS502/6 (23 Aug. 2016).
62 Minutes of the third meeting of the trade committee of the EU-Colombia/Peru Trade Agreement
2016, at 5/7, supra n. 44.
63 EU Commission, Report on Implementation of Free Trade Agreements 2017, at 12, supra n. 14.
64 Acta de la primera reunión del comité de comercio EU-Colombia/Peru (2014), at 5/7, supra n. 56.
65 Piérola & Horlick, supra n. 10.
66 Davis, supra n. 52.
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Another remark that can be made about this dispute is that Peru appears to
have in place a very similar taxation system for spirits, and similarly in violation of
PTA and GATT obligations. During the first two meetings of the governing
committee of the EU-Colombia/Peru PTA, the EU expressed concerns with
respect to both Colombia and to Peru.67 The threat of litigation was equally
addressed to both.68 However, at the moment of starting WTO proceedings, the
EU decided to lodge a complaint only against Colombia. Many reasons may lie
behind this choice, including some as simple as the size and the strategic impor-
tance of the market. Aside from this, it will be interesting to see whether and how
Peru will decide to comply with its obligations. The EU Commission has recently
affirmed that the Peruvian taxation system for spirits is in violation of the PTA, and
it is a ‘matter of priority’.69
For the purposes of this article, it is important to highlight that, although the
framework established by the PTA failed to resolve the dispute, the EU tried to use
it to this end. First, it had Colombia undertake a specific commitment during the
negotiations of the PTA, as suggested by previous scholarship.70 Then, it used the
meetings of the committees to solicit compliance. By employing these two
approaches, and by waiting for the deadline of August 2015 to expire before
starting legal proceedings, the EU showed trust in the fact that this dispute could
be solved in this framework. The EU could well have started WTO proceedings
back in 2011, but it chose to wait.
This story shows how a dispute can be tackled within the framework of a
PTA. Many other similar issues may have been tackled and resolved in the
framework of PTAs. As we cannot make counterfactuals, we cannot know
whether other PTA informal disputes could have become WTO disputes.
However, this case shows that a dispute that the PTA parties unsuccessfully tried
to resolve through the framework of a PTA eventually became a WTO dispute.
5 CONCLUSIONS
By focusing on EU PTAs, this article has shown that, as it is the case for the WTO
committees, the committees established by the PTAs can have a complementary
role to litigation.
The design and number of the committees of EU PTAs varies, but they all
foresee the establishment of at least a governing committee, tasked with overseeing
67 Acta de la primera reunión del comité de comercio EU-Colombia/Peru (2014), at 2/7, supra n. 56;
Acta de la segunda reunión del comité de comercio EU-Colombia/Peru (2015) at 1–2/6, supra n. 42.
68 Acta de la segunda reunión del comité de comercio EU-Colombia/Peru (2015), at 1–2/6, supra n. 42.
69 EU Commission, Report on Implementation of Free Trade Agreements 2017, at 36, supra n. 14.
70 Mavroidis & Sapir, supra n. 13.
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the implementation of the agreement. The most advanced and comprehensive EU
PTAs provide for a more sophisticated institutional structure made up of several
sub-committees, where close and expert-driven dialogue can take place.
An analysis of the minutes of the EU-Colombia/Peru PTA has shown how
the PTA partners discuss and resolve some trade concerns in the dialogue between
the governing committee and the sub-committees. While not all issues are
resolved, the EU Commission has reported progress in some areas. The lack of
transparency on the activities of these committees make it hard for the moment to
conclude whether and to what extent resolution of disputes takes place in all the
committees of EU PTAs.
It is even more difficult to answer the question of whether these committees
are an effective mean of resolution of disputes, or simply resolve issues that would
be resolved in any ordinary bilateral meeting. The establishment of a framework
for continuous technical and political dialogue could make the resolution of
disputes more likely, but we cannot know whether, if this framework did not
exist, some of the issues could trigger formal dispute proceedings.
Although we cannot know which issues addressed in the EU PTA committees
could become formal disputes, this article has provided an example of a formal
WTO dispute that has first been tackled in the context of an EU PTA committees.
This is the dispute on taxation of spirits that the EU has lodged against Colombia
in 2016. Although in this case the PTA failed to resolve the dispute, it is interesting
to observe how the EU tried to use the EU-Colombia/Peru PTA to constrain
Colombia to change its tax system.
ANNEX 1 LIST OF EU PTAS
This list comprises all the PTAs currently applied between the EU and its trade
partners. The list has been compiled by retrieving the necessary information from
the website of the Directorate-General of Trade of the EU Commission.71 It
should be noted that the agreements are always referred to as agreements between
the EU and its partners, even when in fact the agreement had been concluded by
the European Community.
The fourth column classifies the EU PTAs in the four categories descripted in
the methodology section: (1) agreements with future EU countries or close
neighbours, (2) agreements with near-bordering countries, (3) agreements with
developing countries, and the (4) agreements with distant countries. It is based on
the classification provided by: Raymond J. Ahearn, ‘Europe’s Preferential Trade
71 DG Trade, negotiations and agreements, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/
negotiations-and-agreements/ (accessed 16 Feb. 2018).
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Agreements: Status, Content, and Implications’ (CRS Report for Congress 2011),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41143.pdf.
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ANNEX 2 LIST OF THE KNOWN COMMITTEES ESTABLISHED
UNDER EU PTAS
The list of the committees established in EU PTAs is drawn primarily by an
analysis of the text of the agreements, and accordingly reports the articles whereby
they are established.
This list is complemented with the information recently made available by the
EU Commission on the implementation of EU PTAs in: Commission Staff Working
Document, Country reports and info sheets on implementation of EU Free Trade
Agreements, accompanying the document ‘Report from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions on Implementation of Free Trade Agreements’, 9.11.2017, SWD(2017)
364 final. This working document reports the existence of some sub-committees
that are not foreseen by the text of the PTA. This list is not exhaustive: other sub-
committees may have been established but not reported in the abovementioned
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